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INTRODUCTION
The Puzzle: The Internet is a wonderful innovation, allowing people around
the world to communicate, trade, and obtain services. Convenient and rich in
choices and opportunities, the Internet is tremendously attractive to buyers.
Naturally, businesses are flocking to the Internet. The warning has been
sounded that those who do not stake a claim in this incredible new
communication medium will be left behind to perish. Yet, with all the
enthusiasm, many buyers hesitate to take a serious plunge. Businesses are told
repeatedly that they must obtain their customers' trust, yet find it more difficult
to gain this trust in cyberspace than in real space. Trust has become a serious
stumbling block to developing e-commerce (electronic commerce).
Why is trust so important? How does trust in cyberspace differ from trust in
real space? And, if it is important, how can businesses become trusted? This
article addresses these questions.
The discussion is framed in terms of the benefits, costs, and risks of trusting
relationships, and the mechanisms that reduce the costs and risks of trusting.
What is trusting? Trusting is a relationship1 among individuals, entities and
institutions, involving a (i) reasonable belief, supported by an acceptable level
I See Rajeev Bhattacharya et al., A Formal Model of Trust Based on Outcomes, in 23
THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, SPECIAL FORUM ON TRUST IN AND BETWEEN
ORGANIZATIONS, 460 (Sim B. Sitkin et al. eds., 1998) (showing that the main view of
trusting is a relationship among individuals and groups and rejecting the view that trust is
merely an individual trait). Trust is defined as expected behavior of the other party and
readiness to risk disappointment. The issue of trusting can be raised only in the context of
interaction with others. See id.
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of verification 2 in (ii) another party's assertion of past facts, present facts, and
future facts (promises). 3 Trust in persons, institutions, and society is not blind;
it emerges with proof.4 Gullibility, hope, and faith are relatives of trusting, 5
but reflect different degrees of the actors' requirements for verification. 6
Reasonable belief should depend on the context of the relationship. Reliability
in love does not necessarily mean reliability in business relationships, and vice
versa. The scope of deeper trust, such as trust in a doctor, lawyer, or priest, is
usually limited to particular areas of knowledge or brands of honesty. Further,
reasonable belief can be established by verifying the trustworthiness of the
other party or by resorting to other sources. The choice of sources often
depends on their relative costs.
2 Some authors add an emotional bond or moral internal drive as a bridge from evidence
to belief. See TRUDY GOVIER, SOCIAL TRUST AND HUMAN COMMUNITIES 24 (1997)
("Cognitively . . . trust is based on a chosen 'leap' from considered evidence to belief
beyond what that evidence would warrant;" that leap is based on an emotional bond among
the actors). These elements have merit, but I omit them to simplify the analysis. Further,
scholars have defined the risk of trusting as asymmetrical information among the parties,
though I decline to add this factor. No two parties have symmetrical information; therefore,
risk exists in any human relationship. The risk of trusting relates to the cost of obtaining the
relevant information and the degree of assurance that the information is true.
I There are numerous definitions of trust. For a survey and proposed definition by
outcome, see Bhattacharya, supra note 1, at 460 (listing dictionary definitions of trust and
distinguishing among cognitive, emotional and behavioral components of trust). Webster's
Dictionary defines trust as the "firm belief or confidence in the honesty, integrity, reliability,
justice, etc. of another person or thing." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN ENGLISH 1436 (3d ed. 1994).
4 See GovIER, supra note 2, at 153 (discussing social trust as social capital, a resource
which emerges with experience); see also Ann Marie Zak, et al., Assessments of Trust in
Intimate Relationships and Self-Perception Process, 138 (2) J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 217, 225
(1998) (finding that the trusting behavior of the participants in the experiments are often self
fulfilling and explaining that blind trust is usually a product of one's self perception).
Trustworthy people are more likely to blindly trust others. See id.
5 Trusting does not mean believing all unverified representations; rather it means
believing unverified representations when it is not unreasonable to do so. "[B]elieving
when most people of the same social group would consider belief naive and foolish"
qualifies as gullibility. See Julian B. Rotter, Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and
Gullibility, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (1980).
6 Gullibility is an unreasonable belief, as the famous story of the sale of the Brooklyn
Bridge demonstrates. Hope involves a strong component of wishing for a future event. A
wise person may observe that "a second marriage is a triumph of hope over experience."
Notwithstanding experience, the second marriage reflects the parties' hope that, with
different spouses and maturity, the second marriage will work. In faith, the quantum of
direct evidence is not as relevant to the believer. But see GOVIER, supra note 2, at 14
(criticizing the distinction between faith as "an undoubting, unconditional belief in which
data for proof and refutation is ignored" and trust as undoubting belief that does not ignore
pertinent proof).
2001] TRUSTING AND NON-TRUSTING ON THE INTERNET 459
Cultural norms shape the parameters of reasonableness of the belief.
Reasonableness may differ depending on whether the norm is lying, frankness,
or vagueness. 7 The law both affects and is affected by these norms. Moreover,
trusting is a reflexive and reciprocal relationship. 8 Trusting often creates
pressure on trusted persons to meet the expectations of the trusting parties.
Signals of mistrust breed mistrust.9 Dirty tricks invite reciprocal dirty tricks.
As compared to verification cost in real space, verification cost on the Internet
is higher. Businesses must learn how to establish trust in the new
communication medium.10 Some believe that the Internet is a free space that
should not, and cannot, be regulated, and that markets can resolve the trusting
problem. I argue that without the bedrock of legitimizing law, trusting on the
Internet will not develop. To be sure, market regulated actors on the Internet
must occupy the first line of enforcement. Internet, and perhaps also real
space, activities are policed by private sector institutions and professional
gatekeepers. To be effective and legitimate, such police must be regulated-
especially when their interests conflict with the interests of those whom they
are required to protect. The law not only punishes breach of trust; it also
provides trusted persons with a reputation, which they value personally and
professionally. Further, the law can enhance the norm of trustworthiness and
increase social trust.
Because building trusting relationships through the Internet is in the making,
we can only speculate on how the process will ultimately mature. Mechanisms
to establish trust, however, have been emerging. Not surprisingly, they are
mostly the same mechanisms used in real space, which are adjusted to the new
7 See GOvIER, supra note 2, at 230 (citing SISSELA BOK, A STRATEGY FOR PEACE (1989)).
"Do it yourself' verification may be less costly and more reliable than verification by
others. But that is not always true. Cost depends on the "doer's" time value and lost
opportunities, as compared to the compensation of experts and agency costs of delegation.
For example, the decision would be made depending on which of the following costs exceed
the others: the cost of "do it yourself' [X (acquiring expertise) + Y (lost opportunities)] or
the cost of delegating verification to others [A (compensation to the delegate) + B (agency
costs)]. Thus, one's own judgment may be decisive because one bears the consequences of
the decision, but one's level of wisdom, knowledge and expertise, may be lower. Though
people ask for the opinions of others, they ultimately make up their own minds.
8 See GOVIER, supra note 2, at 27 (asserting that trust is a reflexive phenomenon; to be
trusted requires having trust).
I See id. at 87-88 (attempt of teachers in a Canadian law school to control students
through minutely detailed rules of examinations led to a culture of mistrust; the attitude of
mistrust bred more mistrust).
10 See JOHN 0. WHITNEY, THE ECONOMICS OF TRUST LIBERATING PROFITS AND
RESTORING CORPORATE VITALITY (1996) (creating trusting within the organization and with
outside parties is profitable as well as good); RODERICK M. KRAMER AND TOM R. TYLER,
TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 232 (1996) (showing the
many ways in which trust is important to organizational life including business
organizations; noting that trust is based in reciprocity and is tied to one's expectations).
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Internet environment. The role of the law in this adjustment is unclear. While
we start from known rules and approaches, new law making and law
enforcement techniques may develop. Further, domestic laws and norms may
spill over to other countries, interacting with their laws and norms. A question
regarding the role of the law has appeared in connection with parties' choices
in designing the rules that govern their relationships. The process by which
legal systems interact has also appeared in the context of regulating areas such
as money laundering and insider trading.
The Internet may lead to different line drawing, in light of the different
constraints, freedoms, and enforcement techniques that the Internet offers.
However, I believe that with respect to trusting and verification the parties will
continue to seek the least costly verification and the highest benefits from
interaction. Therefore, the law will continue to provide and strengthen the
norms for self-enforcement and legitimacy for verifiers. This law may not
necessarily be domestic law supported by a political or international force. It
may be enforced in other ways. Because people will feel constrained to follow
it, it will be legitimate law. If law's support of norms and verifiers remains
weak, the cost of trusting will dissipate its benefits and the hope that the
Internet holds for a more productive and cohesive world is not likely to
materialize.
I. TRUSTING AND NON-TRUSTING: RELATIVE COSTS, BENEFITS,
AND RISKS
Trusting involves costs, benefits, and risks to both the trusted and the
trusting parties. The division of these components among the parties is
difficult to establish because the parties can transfer the costs and benefits
between each other. Therefore, it is easier to speak of these costs, benefits, and
risks in the aggregate. Viewed separately, however, if the risks and costs of
reducing the risks to the trusting party are higher than the benefits, the party
will not interact. If the costs to the trusted party of establishing its
trustworthiness are higher than the benefits, it will not interact. The parties
will enter into a relationship, however, if third parties, including the
government through the law, reduces their costs, bridging the gap. As
discussed later, these third parties are usually institutions and intermediaries
whose trustworthiness is backed by law.
A trusting person can verify facts and promises from the trusted party or
other alternative sources. The differences in verification costs are greatly
affected by the number of the interactions among the parties. Establishing
trustworthiness of another is costly. However, once the other party is proven
trustworthy, there is no need to verify its statements of facts or its promises,
even if some monitoring is required." When negotiating with the Russians,
1 Some cultures focus on the identity of counter parties. They decline to do business
with foreigners, members outside the family group, or another race, or strangers unless
introduced by reliable friends. The quantum and sources of evidence form the measures of
[Vol. 81:457
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during the Cold War, President Reagan used the phrase: "Trust, but verify.' 12
This statement drew chuckles because if the other party is trusted, there is no
need to verify its statements and promises. The need to prove truthfulness of
facts and reliability of promises signifies absence of trust in the other party.
For example, if the cost of verifying a fact and a promise is $X, and the
relationship (with one or more persons) involves Y facts and promises, a non-
trusting party would have to spend $XY to verify. A trusting party would have
to spend $0. A greater number of transactions among parties render trusting
increasingly cheaper than non-trusting. For the non-trusting party, the cost
rises by the magnitude of XY with each transaction. For the trusting party, the
cost remains close to zero. The cost of establishing trusting-$E-should be
now added. For the non-trusting party (that verifies from outside sources) the
cost of establishing trusting is zero. Monitoring is our next item-$M. In each
case, monitoring is a function of the risks from the relationship. The higher the
risk, the higher the monitoring cost would be. I assume that in non-trusting
relationships, the risk from the relationship is Z% and the cost of monitoring is
$MZ. In trusting relationships, the risk from the relationship is W% and the
costs of monitoring is $MW. In sum, to determine the relative costs of trusting
and non-trusting we may use this crude formula: For trusting parties: E (cost of
establishing the relationship) + MW (cost of monitoring determined by the
level of risk). For non-trusting parties: XY (cost of verifying each fact and
promise) + MZ (cost of monitoring determined by the level of risk).13
In general, after the initial investment in establishing the relationship,
personal trusting offers the parties the benefits of lower risks and information
costs. 14  Further, trust can substitute for and reduce the costs of formal
contracts. There is evidence that in trusting relationships people forego costly
formal contracts. There are corporations that do business only on a handshake,
although they are usually relatively small. 15 Also, in trusting relationships, the
reasonableness of belief on which trusting is based. One can reasonably believe statements
made by a trusted person, similar to indirect evidence. One can reasonably believe in the
reliability of promises by trusting the promisor on the basis of the promisor's character,
reputation, and past performance. Independent verification, such as proof by documents or
independent parties, (e.g., accountants, lawyers, independent witnesses, or experts, or
guarantors) may support the trustworthiness of the trusted party.
12 Associated Press, Historic Missile Treaty Signed; Leaders Pledge Further Efforts for
Arms Control, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1987, at AI.
13 This analysis is similar to Coase's Theory of the Firm. A firm can be viewed as an
organizational form that enhances trusting, thereby reducing costs of interaction. If
contracts were adequate, the firm would not be necessary. This argument was suggested by
Professor Michael Meurer.
14 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 284 (5th ed. 1998) ("Honesty,
trustworthiness, and love reduce the costs of transactions."). There is also the psychological
benefit of simplified complex information. Social trusting, that is trusting by a large group
governed by similar trusting norms, can also enhance economic prosperity.
15 See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining With Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs:
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parties are unlikely to face the Prisoner's Dilemma.16 This classic dilemma
shows that reasoning from self-interest can be self-defeating. 17  Finally,
trusting arguably benefits the economy. Even if we view the world as an
association of individuals, their survival depends on each other. A measure of
trusting must be forged among us, or we will die.
There are indications that social trusting is crucial to economic prosperity,
and perhaps, the very existence of individuals and society. 18 Specialization is a
A Default Rule For Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 643 (1993) (noting
that trust may substitute for legal formalities, such as contracts, in on-going relationships);
Michael Meyer, Here's a "Virtual' Model for America's Industrial Giants, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 1993, at 40 (describing Kingston Technology Corporation and its lack of formal
dealing). "Trust cements the network. It is the essence of our relationships .... The deals
were closed on a handshake, Kingston style." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 93 n.3 (2000)
(describing the Prisoner's Dilemma as a non-cooperative game). In this game, two suspects
are kept incommunicado in different prison cells, and offered the following: if one confesses
and the other does not, the confessor received half a year in prison and the non-confessor ten
years. If both confess, each receives 5 years. If neither confesses, each receives one year.
Their best bet is not to confess, but that depends on whether the other will. See id. Most
terms of the bargain remain implicit anyway, regardless of how detailed contracts are. It is
often more efficient to deal with another party that tends to reach working solutions and
shares a similar sense of fairness than with a party that "goes by the (contract) book." In a
trust relationship, the parties know approximately what each can be expected to do in the
case of misunderstanding, and are willing to take the risk that the result will not be
satisfactory. That risk taking is not only reasonable but is likely to be cost-saving.
17 See GOvIER, supra note 2, at 11 (The Prisoner's Dilemma "serves to indicate the self-
defeating character of the single-minded and solitary pursuit of one's own self-interest.").
Another benefit from trusting is demonstrated in the workplace. Recently, American
businesses have worked hard to create trusting and cooperation among their employees, and
between employees and management. Far more discretion has been vested in employees. A
similar pattern of limited cooperation among competing business organizations is also
developing. See WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 191 (arguing that creating a trusting
environment within the organization and outside is both profitable and good). See Special
Forum on Trust in and Between Organizations, 23 THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
459 (Sim B. Sitkin et al. eds., 1998) (containing papers on trusting building and its benefits
in business organizations and defining trust using mathematical models); see also Bruce
Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 547 (1993) (arguing against the concept of a corporation as a contract and
emphasizing the role of trust and loyalty in the corporate organization); Giancarlo
Spangnolo, Social Relationships and Cooperation in Organizations, 38 J. ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 1 (1999) (addressing "the effects of social relationships on
cooperation (or collusion) in organizations (or communities)"and arguing that the
employment of members of the same community facilitates cooperation in production and
increases social capital because "the linkage generates transfers of 'trust'").
18 See GOVIER, supra note 2, at 153 ("For politics, economics, and personal well-being,
social trust is a valuable resource."). Social capital is defined as a moral resource and a
public good that is self-perpetuating and lubricates the growth of trust in society. See id.
[Vol. 81:457
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necessary component of a prosperous economy. Specialization requires
interdependence, which cannot exist without a measure of trusting. 19 In an
entirely non-trusting relationship, interaction would be too expensive and too
risky to maintain. 20 There is a correlation between the level of trusting
relationships on which members of a society operate and the level of that
society's trade and economic prosperity. 21
On the Internet, there are similar benefits, costs, and risks from trusting.
The balance among the trusting and trusted, however, is different than the
balance in real space. Sellers on the Internet can benefit from increased
number of customers and revenues and decreased costs of real space storage.
and inventory. Moreover, the sellers' risks are no higher than their risks in real
space and may even be lower (e.g., robbery). Hence, it pays to do business
through the Internet and expend more resources to gain the customers' trust.
Benefits to shoppers on the Internet are also higher than in real space in
terms of savings of time. Costs of verification, however, render their risks far
higher. While it opens connections to the world, the Internet allows relatively
few signals that support trustworthiness to pass through. In fact, it enables
people to create virtual worlds, personalities, and products that do not
Lack of trust is costly in psychological terms. The unknown is risky; it breeds fear and
anxiety, which can be debilitating. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 4 (1980),
quoted in BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST, 10 (1983) ("But a complete
absence of trust would prevent him even from getting up in the morning. He would be prey
to a vague sense of dread, to paralyzing fears. He would not even be capable of formulating
distrust and making that a basis for precautionary measures, since this would presuppose
trust in other directions. Anything and everything would be possible. Such abrupt
confrontation with the complexity. of the world at its most extreme is beyond human
endurance."); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43
DUKE L.J. 425, 432-33 (1993) (noting that the destruction of trust would be the "destruction
of the possibility of social relations").
19 See GOvIER, supra note 2, at 26 (noting the element of vulnerability required to trust in
matters with which we are unfamiliar). In complex societies we need to trust many people,
including experts on information that we do not understand, even if it were disclosed to us.
See id.; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 803-04 (1983) (discussing
specialization and its relation to fiduciary law; specialization is the most efficient way to
utilize knowledge).
20 Nature's world is no different; sharks are one of the few exceptions. See Behavior
(visited May 24, 1999) <http://www.seaworld.org/sharks/behavior.html> (noting that sharks
are basically asocial).
21 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 7 (1995) (noting that a nation's ability to compete is conditioned by the level of
trust inherent in the society); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE
AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER 256 (1999) (defining attributes such as honesty
and fairness as social capital, produced by private markets to increase profits); WHITNEY,
supra note 10 (asserting that trusting is profitable as well as good); Bruce Chapman, Trust,
Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547
(1993).
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materialize. Customers' cost-benefit analysis suggests that the convenience of
Internet shopping is significantly reduced by its risks.
In general, it is costly to persuade others of one's trustworthiness. A new
relationship may bloom over time into a trusting relationship. In both trust and
non-trust, uncertainty and risk are reduced with experience. 22 Verification
depends on past, and frequency of, experience. People are creatures of habit;
habits are long-term and personality traits are life-long. In personal
relationships, it is easier to discover whether the other party can perform her
promises, has the necessary money or product, or possesses the requisite
skill.23  One detects signals attributed to general character traits, such as
responsiveness, dependability, and honesty.24 During the process, people offer
reciprocal reassurance and accommodation, as well as joint monitoring which
reduces the risk of disappointed expectations. 25  As nothing is certain,
however, efforts to fully rely on another may fail. Notwithstanding the
tendency to repeat patterns of behavior, a trusted party may change, for
example, with age or illness, marriage, or great temptation. The trustworthiness
of an institution may change with changing control and different key
personnel.
To establish and maintain personal trusting is costly also in terms of lost
opportunities. A person can interact with a limited number of people. There
are even fewer persons with whom the interaction can be long-term. Usually
people in poor societies limit their business interaction to family, which limits
their ability to recruit talent for their businesses. 26  Families with many
children may maintain thriving businesses for generations if some of the
children continue to develop the family business. But limiting the leadership
of a business to family members puts the business at a competitive
disadvantage that, at some point, may lead to its demise. 27 Thus, establishment
and maintenance of personal trust involves lost opportunities for individuals
and businesses.
22 See GOvIER, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that the degree of trust increases with positive
interactions, and decreases with negative interactions).
23 But see ROLF ZIEGLER, TRUST AND THE RELIABILITY OF EXPECTATIONS, RATIONALITY
AND SOCIETY 427 (1998) ("In the short run, an actor may decide to raise his forecasting
ability by increased but costly attention, but in the medium run it can only be improved by
learning processes.").
24 See JOHN G. HOLMES & JOHN K. REMPEL, CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 187, 192 (Clyde
Hendrick ed. 1989) (citing Kelly & Stahelsk, 1970; Miller & Holmes, 1975).
25 See id.
26 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 21, at 78-79 (noting that Chinese, unlike American
entrepreneurial families, are likely to remain small and internally managed due to distrust of
outsiders).
27 See id. (noting that distrust of non-family members usually prevents
institutionalization of Chinese businesses and drawing on outside talent). When trusting
relationships have evolved not within the family but within a large work place, the work
place is sufficiently large to maintain and nurture talent.
[Vol. 81:457
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One effective mechanism that reduces the cost and risks of personal trusting
is the utilization of trusted legitimate institutions and intermediaries, both
private and public. Institutions reduce trusting costs regardless of consumers'
culture and regardless of whether personal trust is mixed with skepticism. For
example, Americans revere their Constitution and the rules of law. They trust
their banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies and the legal controls
under which these institutions are made trustworthy. Americans have a
reasonable belief in these institutions. On the personal side of the same coin,
Americans have a significant degree of what some would call healthy
skepticism in their politicians, lawyers, bankers, and mutual fund money
managers. The argument that institutions have no identity because they are
merely composed of individuals is flawed. Institutions have a personality apart
from the people who compose them. This personality is comprised of their
internal structures, rules, leadership, and their relationships among their staff as
well as with the outside world. Institutions have a history and a reputation for
competence and honesty (or the reverse) which they can build or destroy. 28
Institutions send, in their unique ways, their brand of signals that can evoke
trust or mistrust. Distinguished from their members, truth-telling institutions,
which honor their promises, will be trusted, as will the persons who act on
their behalf.29 Others will not.30
28 Note the following two examples: In the 1950s an aggressive and successful young
underwriting firm, Otis & Co, reneged on its underwriting obligations on the ground that the
issuer did not provide accurate information in its prospectus. The huge potential liability
caused Otis to petition for bankruptcy protection. See Bankruptcy Referee Asks Court
Dismiss Reorganization Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, at 53. The company was put up
for sale even before the final decision. See Otis to Consider Offers for its Retail Business,
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1951, at 17. Otis won the case. See Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis &
Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1952) (defendants won because contract at issue was
unenforceable and prospectus misrepresentation was illegal under securities laws). The
management of Salomon Brothers turned its attention away from employees that violate the
law but brought substantial profits. See John H. Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No.
31,554 (Dec. 3, 1992). Even though it settled the charges against it, it lost its independence
five years thereafter to Travelers. See Thomas S. Mulligan, Travelers to Buy Salomon Bros.
for $9 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997 at Al, A12. After the 1991 scandal, Salomon
was "financially crippled" and sold to Warran Buffet. When the company was sold again in
1997, a commentator noted that it "never really regained [its] position" after the scandal. Id.
29 See GovIER, supra note 2, at 206 (noting that public perceptions of leaders of an
organization reflect upon the individual members; this is exemplified by the widespread use
of advertising).
30 For centuries, intermediaries have served to reduce the cost of trusting relationships
among strangers. Financial intermediaries earned their keep by creating trusting
relationships with customers, and enforcing promises among strangers. For example, the
Rothschilds have facilitated trusting relationships by inter-positioning themselves among
unknown parties, and offering a competent family network backed by substantial capital.
Likewise, banks have offered letters of credit to establish a trusting relationship among
traders in different lands. Purchases by catalogs are made possible by the inter-positioning
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The benefits of institutional or impersonal trusting are very great. People
can trade with strangers through trusted intermediaries and institutions based
on impersonal trust.3' The relative costs of personal trusting described above
involve sunken costs (long-term repeat relationships that may also prove to be
disappointing), lost opportunities (limiting the range of human interaction both
in number and geographically), and monitoring. In comparison, trust in
institutions and intermediaries are cheaper to establish.
First, the number of institutions is smaller than the number of people with
whom business can be conducted, a factor that reduces the investment in
verifying the trustworthiness of the institutions. In addition, buyers, investors,
borrowers, and depositors can move from one institution to another with little
cost.
32
Second, institutions have relative longevity, and can build impressive
reputations, both positive and negative. 33 Thus, there are little sunken costs in
establishing trusting relationships with institutions such as banks or large
retailers. Establishing impersonal trust in them is therefore less expensive.
Third, institutions reduce lost opportunities of interacting with strangers,34
allowing people to deal with strangers and benefit from services of capable
strangers who function under the umbrella of the institutions. 35 Thus, like all
intermediaries, the costs of establishing the truthfulness and reliability of the
strangers and employees are borne by the institutions at costs lower than the
costs to the individual customers.
Fourth, and most importantly, risks from trusting commercial and financial
of banks and credit card banking associations. The securities markets would not exist
without the inter-positioning of brokers and dealers, who ensure execution of transactions
among strangers in volatile markets. While it is likely that one of the parties will renege on
the trade, the intermediary has an interest in executing the transaction because that is when
the intermediary receives his compensation. Very few trades are litigated for breach.
Intermediaries perform similar functions in other markets.
31 In comparing American impersonal trusting with Japanese personal trusting, one can
see the weakness of the Japanese system. The focal point of this weakness is with regard to
financial institutions, which Japan is now remodeling. In an international economy,
impersonal trusting has become crucial to national economic prosperity.
32 For example, many state laws prohibit banks from penalizing borrowers who wish to
refinance mortgages (that is, pay off their mortgage loans and take loans at lower interest).
31 See GOVIER, supra note 2, at 153. Social trust is based on the experience of
individuals and groups. People involved in associations are not likely to let others down, for
their personal reputations would suffer if they did. "For politics, economics, and personal
well-being, social trust is a valuable resource." Id.
34 See GOVIER, supra note 2, at 24-25 (contrasting modern trust in institutions with
Swedish village life where consumers only transact with known merchants). A sociologist
"ties modem trust more to people's sense of how institutions operate than to their attitudes
towards unknown individuals." Id.
31 See id. at 29 ("To live in a complex society without going mad, we must have trust in
systems too.").
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institutions are reduced by law. The institutions are strictly regulated and
surrounded by substantial guarantees against misfortune. All of these benefits
are too costly for individuals to ensure through self-help. This role of the law
in strengthening trusting relationships is described in section III below.
On the Internet, verification of trustworthy persons, on the one hand, and
facts and promises, on the other hand, is more costly for the trusting person as
compared to those in real space. The Internet exposes buyers to greater
misinformation for it is technically easier to show on the Internet items that
look real but are not. In real space, one can judge a store by its location,
appearance, customers, and many other signals. On the Internet, one can show
a beautiful store that does not exist, hide information about people, and
disseminate more misinformation. There is neither body language nor voice
signals to guide the viewer, for today the printed word is the main medium of
Internet communication. 36
Thus, situations that do not require trusting and involve low or no
verification costs involve higher costs on the Internet. In real space, the
purchaser of a newspaper bears little or no cost in verifying the newspaper and
its price, and no promise is involved because the exchange is simultaneous.
Transactions on the Internet are not simultaneous. A newspaper purchase
involves higher costs of verifying that the newspaper ordered, especially if
paid for in advance, will be delivered on time. Thus, on the Internet, both the
costs of verifying statements and promises in non-trusting relationships, and
the cost of establishing personal relationships and verifying trustworthiness are
likely to be higher than in real space. These high costs are evidenced by the
new third parties that provide verification services regarding transactions and
actors on the Internet, while none of such services are offered in real space.
All these services come at a cost.
Risks from third parties undermines consumers' trust in the Internet.
Consumers who provide sellers with credit card and other information are
exposed to an additional risk that the information will be misappropriated and
abused. Under United States law, if stolen credit cards are used for
unauthorized purchases, banks or sellers must indemnify consumers for losses
above $50. But on the Internet, consumers may not know that their card
numbers have been stolen because they still hold their cards. If the thieves
change the account addresses and the consumers fail to notice that they did not
receive bills, consumers may not notify the bank of the loss of the cards. They
will be personally liable and their credit will be destroyed.
Third parties harm consumers by malicious hyper-links and "spamming"-
an avalanche of advertising causing bottlenecks on consumers' computers.
36 Most business relationships on the Internet today do not involve the offer and receipt
of personal services, such as medical and legal services, which must involve a higher level
of trusting than purchasing goods. Through the Internet, trading transactions are more
costly and riskier than in real space for the same reasons that medical and legal services are
costlier in real space.
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Technology provides some redress from these harms, at a cost, and only
temporarily, until spammers have designed software to circumvent the
protections. Congress, however, is acting on this issue.3
7
Credit cards and debit cards are useful devices that expose customers to
risks. The cards resemble letters of credit that were established through banks
hundreds of years ago to facilitate trading among strangers in different
countries. Sellers are not willing to take the risk of payment after sending the
sold products. At the same time, buyers have the option of contesting the
charges and that constitutes the banks as arbitrators of a dispute between the
parties.
The value of the cards to both parties gives the banks enforcement powers,
provided they follow fair and unbiased procedure. These procedures are
subject to regulation, and banks have self-interest in following them to gain
lucrative, trust-based business. This mechanism, however, exposes customers
and sellers to risk from third parties. Personal and financial information may
be stolen from sellers, exposing customers to loss of property, and sellers to
extortion. If sellers refuse to pay, the thieves publish the customers' card
numbers. Further, like customers, businesses suffer from spamming
bottlenecks, called "denial of service." Businesses also suffer from the spread
of lies and gossip about their products.
Finally, businesses that are expending funds and efforts to build reputation
may be hurt from the misdeeds of a few "bad apples," especially newcomers to
the industry, if seed capital is small. If some of these newcomers are
dishonest, they can deplete the wealth of social trusting that society and most
businesses have developed.
In addition, traditional policing and enforcement against illegal actions is
weaker on the Internet, although the Internet does offer added enforcement
tools, including publication and automated monitoring. Thus, both costs and
risks for buyers (and some for sellers) on the Internet are higher than in real
space. Sooner or later, consumers recognize the danger. 38
II. RISK REDUCTION
In general, common interests can reduce the risks associated with trusting,
as similarity of character can. 39 Parties to a relationship with similar interests
17 See Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001, H.R. 95, 107th Cong.
(2001).
3 Consumers who are not familiar with communicating on the Internet seem to be more
gullible than they would be in real space. They view experts in Internet communications as
more trustworthy. Thus there is something like a reverse order: expertise produces
dependency and dependency produces trust.
39 Russell Hardin defines trust mostly in terms of encapsulated interest. See Russell
Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L. REv. (forthcoming June 2001). I argue that
encapsulated interest is a risk-reducing situation that contributes to trusting but is not
trusting per se.
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and few alternatives are likely to be trustworthy towards each other. The
stronger their self-interest in the relationship, the more trustworthy they will
be. A relationship, in which at least one party can terminate without serious
adverse effects, will have weak interdependence and verification, increasing
the likelihood that this party will renege on its promises as more attractive
opportunities arise.40
Similar incentives operate on the Internet. Information about persons on the
other side of an e-mail message is costly to verify, making personal trust
building on the Internet better achieved by sharing, as in real space. Groups
sharing areas of interest, values, or ideas can build trust relationships among
themselves, sometimes to the exclusion of, or even against, others. Anonymity
can help shy people be frank. For example, people tend to share their secrets
on an airplane ride, when they believe that they will probably never see each
other again. Similarly, consumers will likely develop associations on the
Internet to share information about products, services, and their own
experiences, and such associations will help reduce the risk to buyers.
Proof of one party's trustworthiness, through consistent behavior, can
reduce the risks associated with trusting. A similar approach works on the
Internet. The Internet site and the brand name have replaced sales persons.
The site has become the contact point with the customer; there is no other. The
site, however, may be less convincing than a salesperson might be. Therefore,
businesses focus on the services they give, by doing it right: they tell the truth
and keep their word. Easy access to businesses is essential, but the best
advertising for businesses is the actual services that they provide. The model
for businesses on the Internet is similar to the model of establishing trusting
relationships in real space, especially for professionals and fiduciaries. With
time, customers' good experiences establish customers' trust. Because
information about bad services can be easily spread, the punishment for being
untrustworthy is faster customer withdrawal in even greater numbers than in
real space.
Self-help can also reduce the risks associated with trusting. Self-help is very
costly on the Internet, even when it is effective in the real world. Despite these
costs, the current trend seems to be towards self-protection. Consumers trust
other parties less than they would in real space and behave as non-trusting
persons would; they require proof of facts and promises and other trust
building evidence. Experts advise consumers to engage in costly self-
protection. They advise consumers to educate themselves about the risks
involving the Internet, to get information about the sellers, to read carefully the
40 See DIEGO GAMBETTA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE PROTECTION
28 (1993) ("[G]ood behavior in business evolve[s] from an economic interest in keeping
promises and acquiring a reputation for honest dealing.... This may also explain why the
opposite norm obtains and the ability to cheat is praised and encouraged."); see also Hardin,
supra note 39 (explaining that our first reaction is to distrust those about whom we have
little knowledge).
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small print regarding warranties, to check the security of credit cards and
financial information; and to consider alternative options, such as ordering by
telephone.
On the Internet, some of the verification costs and burdens have shifted from
buyers to sellers. The shift is efficient. First, commercial and financial
institutions can reap enormous benefits from Internet communications.
Presumably, that gives them incentives to expend more efforts to gain
customers' trust. New market entrants, or sellers of new products, recognize
the need to capture customers' trust even in real space.
Second, as compared to real space, the level of customers' commitment is
not as high. While buyers are exposed to more costs and risks in Internet
transactions, buyers have alternatives to buy in real space, even though they
lack the convenience and choices of Internet shopping. As their risks and costs
have risen, many customers are inclined to expend little effort in reducing their
risks. Thus, in relation to verification, the bargaining power between these two
groups has changed and shifted from buyers to sellers.
Third, the cost of proof and risk reduction may be lower for the sellers than
for the consumers. Although sellers can shift the added costs to consumers,
competition limits such increases. Therefore, even if sellers transfer some of
the costs, buyers' increased costs will still be lower than if the buyers had to
verify the facts and promises themselves. Fourth, the more sellers succeed in
convincing customers of their facts and promises, the lower their burden
becomes as they build a trusting relationship with their customers.
Finally, many sellers have begun to recognize that they are better off uniting
than competing on the issue of trustworthiness. A race to the bottom will bring
Internet use to the bottom as well. Therefore, there should be, and hopefully
there is, a growing tendency to monitor others, at least in the same industry, to
maintain a minimal level of trustworthiness.
Market actors can reduce the risks associated with trusting. Sellers can offer
self-binding obligations, such as warranties, and "no questions asked" return
policies. Lower information and verification costs can reduce the risks
associated with trusting. A reputation for being trustworthy is one such
mechanism that businesses can also acquire in the market. 41 Hence, people
rely on reputation, good or bad, as a form of verification, as an added comfort
or as the least expensive alternative when direct sources of information are too
costly. In commerce, it is reasonable to believe that a person's performance
41 Market reputation has a different weight than personal observation, yet can carry
weight of the aggregate opinion of others. It is more like price, a "black box," unless others
have similar concerns. Reputation is a marketing device, distinguishing competitors in the
markets. Trustworthy people offer reduced information costs to other parties, and can
therefore charge more for their services and products. When transactions are trust-
dependent to the extent that most people would not engage in a business relationship
without trusting, the assurance of trusting becomes crucial to the transaction. In such a case,
the interference of the law as a guarantor of trustworthiness may be cost reducing and even
necessary.
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will be consistent with his past performance and representations, unless there
are indications to the contrary. People are bound by inertia and the pace of
change in their behavior is slower that other changes in the environment.
Those who are fickle, depending on how closely they are watched, are unlikely
to become steadfast. Those who are reliable, regardless of whether they are
watched are not, are unlikely to become erratic. In terms of learning and
prediction, too many drastic changes in behavior are costly to the actors and to
those who deal with them. Thus, people develop habits, and believe that others
will stick to theirs.
On the Internet, information tools can develop for individuals. For example,
direct traders can create a personal business reputation on the Internet, as the
eBay42 experience has shown. Traders on the Internet eBay site are likely to
rely on their own experiences, and on those of others regarding other
individuals' behavior, and choose their trading partners according to the
reputation they developed for telling the truth and keeping their word. The low
publication costs, and eBay's services, provide powerful information that helps
make or break a reputation fairly quickly. The reputation of traders on eBay's
site affects the prices traders can obtain or are willing to pay. A trader with a
good reputation will attract more bidders who will bid the price up. A trader
with a poor reputation will attract fewer bidders, who will not bid the price for
the same item as high.
A reputation-forming device, such as membership in professional and other
groups, can also reduce the risks associated with trusting. Membership
signifies a high probability that members have passed the requirements of entry
into that group, be they educational requirements (e.g., medical), character-
based requirements (e.g., clergy), or simply acceptance by peers and
conformity to the rules of the group (e.g., trade organizations). Thus,
accountants, lawyers, physicians, and others command trusting in their
competence and honesty. Many groups subscribe to norms that build
trustworthiness, and impose on members a duty to enforce the norms,
rendering the norms powerful and the members credible.43
Internet businesses have followed the real space model, and formed societies
whose main function is to gain the customers' trust. Internet businesses
recognize that their competitors, who may act unwisely, can adversely affect
their own reputation. For example, Financial Services Technology Consortium
is composed of competitors, who combine to create a "public good," that is,
trustworthiness for all, and monitor their members to maintain this public
good. 44
42 See eBay (visited Mar. 12, 2001) <http://pages.ebay.com/help/basics/n-is-ebay-
safe.html> (touting site's "built-in safeguards" to ensure buyers and sellers are "honest and
reliable").
43 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF
COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 65-66 (1997) (describing metanorms).
44 See Financial Services Technology Consortium (visited March 9, 2001)
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Markets are populated by private sector professionals and organizations with
significant reputations, which act as reliable verifiers of others' assertions of
facts and promises. They can verify the information or actually lend their
credit and name to back the sellers' obligations. That involvement offers
parties both an additional trusted obligor and an indirect assurance of verified
information, which the obligor will gather to protect its interests. Accountants
and lawyers act as market verifiers of information. They command trust by
membership in self-regulating organizations, and by strict government
regulation. They verify information about the trustworthiness of strangers.
There are organizations that check businesses for trustworthiness in terms of
expertise and proof.45  Rating agencies perform a similar function. They
evaluate bonds after gathering information about issuers including an
evaluation of the creditworthiness (trustworthiness) of the issuers. The rating
agency, Moody's Investor Service, 46 offers for a fee, "trust packages" to
parties who wish to reduce their risk of business relationships with unknown
parties abroad. It ascertains whether the unknown party abroad is trustworthy
by verifying information, offering the same kind of fact-finding that people
engage into develop a trusting relationship. Moody's has developed a list of
factors that demonstrate trustworthiness, collects information about the
unknown party's consistency in performing its promises, paying its debts,
making true statements, and conducting long-term relationships. 47 In fact,
Moody's has commodified, and is selling, trustworthiness. 48
Internet businesses have followed the same model. The Internet markets
have additional third party fact verifiers, especially when information can be
<http://www.fstc.org> (comprising 90 organizations working in collaboration to create new
methods for "commercial transaction on the Internet").
45 It is suggested that the value of board directorship for busy corporate leaders is in
"networking" and current information, including information about other actors in their
field.
46 See Moody's Investor Service (visited March 9, 2001) <http://www.moodys.com>
(providing "independent credit ratings research and financial information" to help investors
analyze credit risks and reduce transaction costs).
4' Banks have offered a similar service in the form of letters of credit since the
seventeenth century. The letters of credit, however, provide a guarantee to parties abroad,
who do not know, and therefore, do not trust the domestic parties' promises. The bank
undertakes, unconditionally, the obligation to pay upon presentation of the bills of lending,
providing evidence that the goods have arrived.
41 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and The Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 253 (1998) (stating that
venture capital funds have an incentive to "monitor entrepreneurs' performance"); see also
Symposium, The Internet and Small Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 1 (1998) (stating that venture capital companies also provide a similar, though more
intrusive service); Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the
Regulations of Small Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 45
(1998).
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manipulated on the Internet. For example, pictures shown on the Internet can
be digitally changed. Third parties can provide verification of products, such
as the true color of women's clothes. This verification was adopted as a selling
point to consumers who otherwise mistrust the on-line display. Unauthorized
persons can alter and sign documents transferred through the Internet.
Technology is developing to ensure the integrity of documents and signatures.
Third party intermediaries offer trust services for Internet businesses, such as i-
Escrow escrow services, to ensure that buyers pay money in advance but the
money reaches the sellers only upon delivery.
Like reputation building in real space, businesses build their reputation
through associations. The United States government offers verification, in the
negative sense, about those who are not trustworthy. The Federal Trade
Commission issues "Consumer Alerts!" on its on-line web site.49 Other
associations issue positive recommendations about businesses that act on the
Internet, similar to the Better Business Bureau's, such as the Center for
Democracy and Technology. 50
Both on the Internet and in real space, trustworthiness can evaporate on
disappointing evidence. But it seems that on the Internet, it can disappear even
faster. One organization, created on the Internet, offered to attach its mark
"TRUSTe" to businesses as a sign of trustworthiness. 5' It is of questionable
success because some businesses that carried the sign did not live up to the
reasonable expectations of the consumers. Consumers reached the conclusion
that TRUSTe did not sufficiently monitor, enforce, or inform about, the
promises of its sign.52
Internet businesses have piggy-backed on trusted real space businesses
because customers seem to trust businesses in real space more than they do
businesses in cyberspace. For example, community banks with a loyal
customer-base can establish similar relationships on the Internet, and far larger
financial institutions may desire to link their products to such banks.
'9 See Federal Trade Commission (visited March 9, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov> ("The
FTC works for the consumer to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices
in the marketplace and to provide information to help consumers spot, stop, and avoid
them.").
" See Center for Democracy and Technology (visited March 9, 2001)
<http://www.cdt.org> (seeking "practical solutions to enhance free expression and privacy
in global communication technologies").
"' See TRUSTe (visited March 9, 2001) <http://www.truste.org> (committed to helping
web users "protect themselves online").
52 Groups with similar interests undertake to enforce the members' obligations to be
trustworthy, thereby maintaining the trustworthiness of the group. See Tamar Frankel,
Should Funds and Investment Advisers Establish a Self-regulatory Organization?, in THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION, UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGING ROLES OF BANKS,
MUTUAL FUNDS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES, 447, 451 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 1997)
(explaining that membership organizations protect the members' reputations while also
establishing ethical standards).
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Sometimes brick and mortar enterprises that have the loyalty and trust of their
customers become aligned with Internet enterprises to bestow on those Internet
enterprises the trust of the retailers' customers.
This arrangement is similar to franchising, franchising not of expertise or
quality of goods, but of trust. For a similar reason, the value of real space
brand names has risen on the Internet. Perhaps this may be one reason why
trademark owners are so concerned about their trademarks and well known
brand names have acquired special protection by Congress.
III. THE ROLE OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF TRUSTING
Under certain circumstances, the reliability of trusted persons, institutions
and other intermediaries cannot be fully supported by the trusted parties
themselves. There comes a point when the parties will not interact because
their costs of verification and proof of trustworthiness will exceed their joint
benefits from the transaction. In these circumstances, legal backing is
necessary. 53 Law offers benefits to both parties. It offers trusting people
reduced risks by preventive regulation of institutions and intermediaries,
before the fact, and compensation as well as punishing violators, after the fact.
Law offers trusted persons a "brand name" guarantee of their trustworthiness,
which may be too costly for trusted persons to create or buy in the markets.
These supports for trusting are financed not by private sector interested
persons, but by all taxpayers. Hence, the cost of maintaining a trusting system
as a whole, in addition to the users of trust relationships, is subsidized and
distributed among a large group through government intermediation. Further,
law strengthens norms of behavior, and reduces the cost of enforcement.
People become trustworthy through habit, with a lower threat of punishment.
Trust verification, especially verification by third parties, is layered. The
first layer is composed of direct trusting relationships. The second layer, in
lieu of or in addition to personal trust, consists of market verifiers. The third
layer is composed of verifying the verifiers-the law. Law regulates trusted
11 For example, assume that a person wishes to hand over his life's savings, $100, to a
manager, expecting $7 in additional benefits in terms of performance and free time, and
paying the manager $1 for his work. Assume further that the probability of losing the $100
through the manager's conversion or incompetence is 50%. The person will not engage in
this transaction because he will not risk losing $50 even if the probability of gaining $6 is
very high. He will, however, interact if the manager provides him with assurance as to the
integrity of the money. However, the manager cannot expend more than $1 minus his living
expenses to provide that assurance. If the cost to the manager of assuring his
trustworthiness is higher, he will not offer it and the parties will not interact. Someone will
have to bridge the gap. That someone may be market verifiers, who can offer verification at
a reduced rate, or the law, through a requirement for insurance, examinations, and other
preventive measures, can ensure either that the money will not be converted, or that the
manager is competent. Trusted private sector qualifiers, however, must also prove their
trustworthiness. The law regulates the most trusted private sector qualifiers, such as lawyers
and accountants.
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persons and intermediaries as well as market verifiers, who establish the
trustworthiness of others.
The law can regulate intermediaries more effectively than individuals.
Intermediaries are often less mobile than individuals and their number is
smaller. As the size of private sector actors and intermediaries increases, they
are likely to be the first tier gatekeepers and enforcers of the law within their
operational territories, including international enforcement. Mergers of banks
and businesses are usually accompanied by stricter requirements for self-
regulation, controls of illegal acts within the organizations, and trustworthiness
towards customers. Professional private sector gatekeepers, such as
accountants, are subject to increasingly strict regulation as they testify to the
trustworthiness of businesses in real space and on the Internet. In contrast,
individuals' costs of establishing the trustworthiness of institutions and other
specialized intermediaries are very high. Even though their number is small,
they are composed of many individuals and their internal activities are not
open to individual customers. More importantly, individuals cannot adopt
preventive measures to ensure the intermediaries' trustworthiness even though
the risks that individuals take, in entrusting their property to institutions, may
be very high.
As the importance of the role of intermediaries increases on the Internet, the
importance of law in reducing the customers' risks and increasing the
trustworthiness of the intermediaries increases. In reaction to consumers'
concerns and Congressional prodding, industries began to establish best
practices in respect to privacy issues. While customers may rely on some
industries' best practices, for financial intermediaries, best practices were held
insufficient. The danger of losing public trust is too great and the
consequences too grave. Further, the law is most important when the public
voices its concern on particular issues.
On the Internet, financial intermediaries need a higher degree of public trust,
as they are eager to cut their costs by establishing Internet communications
with customers. Hence, Congress directed regulators to impose rules of
confidentiality on financial intermediaries. 54 On March 2, 2000, the Securities
and Exchange Commission published a proposed rule that would restrict
broker dealers', investment companies', and registered investment advisers'
ability to utilize customers' personal nonpublic information. 55 Bank regulators
are proposing similar rules.56
The Internet has both increased and decreased the cost of law enforcement.
14 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 504, 15 U.S.C. § 6804 (1999) (requiring specified
federal agencies to adopt rules restricting the ability of certain financial institutions to
"disclose nonpublic personal information about consumers").
51 See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. 12,354
(2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248) (proposed Mar. 2, 2000).
56 See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 8770 (2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332) (proposed Feb. 22, 2000).
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It is unclear what the net costs are. The increased costs are caused by the
global impact of the Internet beyond state boundaries. The decrease is based
mainly on ease of communication, such as consumers' complaints, information
from other agencies and other countries, and technical innovations, such as
surfing the Internet for fraudulent advertising.
The Internet and the law affect each other. For example, the contract rule of
caveat emptor is sufficient to create trusting among buyers and sellers in face-
to-face relationships, but not in e-mail communications. Hence, contract
doctrine may change and become more "fiduciary-like" and customer friendly.
The requirement to tell the truth and be reliable will not be linked to the
parties' explicit agreements, but to the default rules that underlie fiduciary law
or to stronger fairness concepts in contract law. These may creep into, and
create, the "contract law of the Internet." Not only will these rules reflect best
practices of industries doing business on the Internet, but also they will be
recognized as crucial to the development of e-business, and as such, acquire
the power and weight sufficient to change legal doctrine.
IV. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF TRUSTING
Technology has helped reduce customers' risks by eliminating the need to
send card account information over the Internet. While the solution is not yet
certain, it seems clear that the issue must be resolved if consumers are to
consider the Internet as their main form of communication with businesses.
In some situations, enforcing the law against violations on the Internet may
be as easy, or even easier, than enforcing the law in real space. In recognition
that "code is law," as Professor Lawrence Lessig argues, government may
regulate certain aspects of Internet operations through code-the means of
Internet communication.57 It is likely that the government will use this method
to fight against serious crimes, which the Internet greatly facilitates. This
method raises issues of government accountability, which are beyond the scope
of this paper. But technology and protection can prompt distrust and eliminate
some trusting behavior, as Professors Lessig and Helen Nissenbaum note. 58
The solutions devised to date are operational, technological, and
organizational. On the operational and organizational side, experts suggest
that consumers avoid some forms of payment on the Internet, such as debit
cards. These cards resemble cash and are too risky. Processes, such as the
process by which credit cards are settled, may have to change. Credit card
57 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Lawrence
Lessig, Preface to Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV 329 (stating that the use of code or technology can
obviate the need to trust).
58 See id. (arguing that technological protection replaces the important social act of
trusting); see also Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron? 81
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that security measures on the internet actually
lower trusting behaviors by creating safe environments under which the act of trusting, i.e.
the act of being vulnerable to another's discretion, is unnecessary).
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transactions that follow real world processes, from merchant to a merchant
processor and then to a credit card association, expose the parties to risks from
thieves. Among others, a safer approach is to let the merchant directly query
the credit card issuing bank for payment authorization. Non face-to-face
merchants are required to take an additional step when they authorize a
purchase. Businesses are using different payment systems for online shopping,
such as digital certificates. There are digital identity services and technical
forms of authentication that help reduce consumers' risk. Non-technical
solutions are also recommended, such as the use of employees for internal
controls, response to possible threats and risks, and the hiring of experts.
On the technological side, businesses are adopting protections against
third party attacks on the Internet business by technical solutions. These
include anti-spamming software and filters against "denial of service attacks."
Most companies have installed secure sockets layer mechanisms to protect web
transactions. Businesses injured by harmful misinformation that frightens
customers away, use trusted sources to combat these harmful effects. The
important point is that corrections come from a trusted source. And, of course,
some businesses choose not to disclose the problems they have, but to simply
correct them.
V. CONCLUSION
In real space and on the Internet, trust and non-trust pose the same issues.
The ways people come to trust in real space and cyberspace differ, however.
That is mainly because the benefits, costs, and risks in Internet interaction have
changed and have been reallocated among sellers and buyers. The costs have
shifted to sellers in order to achieve the same goal-establishing trusting
relationships on which economic activity depends.
The model that emerges is that of "layered trusting supports." No one layer
can create a culture of trust. Reputable institutions and intermediaries,
verifiers, and providers of trust services, contribute to public trusting. But
more of them are needed on the Internet, and the law must continue to provide
the backbone of legitimacy for their trustworthiness. Perhaps stronger support
is needed on certain issues. For example, the Internet offers grand scale
opportunities to destroy software in which communications and ideas are
stored. To prevent such destruction we may need a worldwide meta-norm.
Today, destructive hackers are still considered the "smart kids" who playfully
show off their genius. Against such damaging games, there is no strong norm
that brings a general revulsion. If children were told, with their first computer,
that computers are for creating, not for destroying; if children develop this
attitude the way they develop the inhibition on playing with matches to avoid
destruction, yet recognizing that fire is good, as the parents show by lighting
candles and the fireplace, then over time a meta-norm can rise to be enforced
not only by governments, but also by members of the public. As the meta-
norm becomes stronger, law's interference can become weaker. But this is a
goal for the future. We can begin by using the tools, based on the elements of
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benefits, costs, and risks, and adjusting them to the new Internet environment.
